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ABSTRACT The toll of human casualties and psychological impacts on societies make any study on
violent extremism worthwhile, let alone attempting to detect patterns among them. This paper is an effort to
predict which violent extremist organization (VEO), among 14 currently active ones throughout the world,
is responsible for a violent act based on 14 features, including its human and structural tolls, its target
type and value, intelligence, and weapons utilized in the attack. Three main steps in our paper include:
1) the visualization of the violent acts through linear and non-linear dimensionality reduction techniques; 2)
sequential forward feature selection based on the generalization accuracy of three machine learning models–
decision tree, and linear and nonlinear SVM; and 3) employing multilayer perceptron to predict the VEO
based on the selected features of a violent act. Top-ranked selected features were related to the target type
and plan and the multilayer perceptron achieved up to 40% test accuracy.
INDEX TERMS Multilayer perceptron, decision tree, SVM, feature selection, visualization.

I. INTRODUCTION

The advance of technology, facility of satellite communications, and ubiquity of the Internet [1] have multiplied
the extent and impact of ideology- and politically-motivated
acts of violence, have expanded their scope beyond specific
locales and regions, and have made them a growing threat
against humanity, across the world [2]. With such violence,
groups or individuals commit acts of unbelievable brutality against a leader, citizens, an entire city, or nation. The
motivation behind it is usually a radicalized interpretation of
defending a greater good, politics, or extreme ideology [3].
However, such acts of violence are always disturbing to
people’s minds, their everyday lives, and destabilizing to
societies. Attacks are associated with human and economic
tolls, and challenge sustainable development in both modern
and developing countries [4]. Groups and individuals committing such violent acts are usually associated with a violent
extremist organization (VEO) [5].
The purpose of this study is to investigate the possibility
of identifying the responsible VEO based on information
available about the violent act. This methodology is useful
for assisting in identification of the VEO behind a violent
act right after it happens, in cases when no VEO publicly
assumes responsibility for a particular act, a VEO assumes
70164

responsibility for a particular act but not immediately, or when a particular VEO falsely assumes responsibility for a violent act conducted by another VEO. To the
authors’ knowledge, the only other attempt to identify the
responsible group for extreme acts of violence was performed
by Hashemi and Hall [6]. They applied six features, including human casualties and fatalities, level of coordination
and expertise, importance of the targeted process, and the
extent of its impact on the process. They achieved a 20%
cross-validation accuracy using a decision tree. Our study
is different in the following aspects: we apply 14 features
instead of six applied in their work, we apply a rigorous
feature selection process, we apply other machine learning
algorithms including a multi-layer perceptron (MLP), and
our MLP achieves double the prediction accuracy achieved in
their work. The eight additional features applied in our work
include: number of hostages, sequential attacks, symbolic
nature of the target, uniqueness of the attack method at the
time, level of execution, target type, weapon type, and attack
type.
Another study related to the theme of this paper
is conducted by Tran et al. [7]. They classified news
articles reporting terrorism events in three southern
provinces of Thailand into four classes: demolition attack,
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FIGURE 1. The machine learning framework for predicting the
responsible VEO for extreme acts of violence.

assassination attack, suicide attack, and unsuccessful attack.
They collected news articles from five Thai news websites:
Thairath, Dailynew, Naewna, Manager, and Khaosod, from
2007 to 2009. Each news article is represented with a term
frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) feature
vector. They applied two classification approaches: fuzzy
inference system (FIS) and adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference
system (ANFIS). ANFIS resulted in better classification
accuracies than FIS. They also classified the same terrorism
attacks using the same two methodologies (FIS and ANFIS)
but applying a different feature set: the attack’s location,
the status of victim, and the status of terrorist, instead of TFIDF feature vectors. This new feature set resulted in better
classification accuracies than the TF-IDF feature vectors.
Fig. 1 shows the outline of this paper. Section 2 presents
an overview of our data and the application of a linear (PCA)
and a nonlinear (kernel PCA) dimensionality reduction technique to visualize it. Section 3 applies the sequential forward
method for feature selection based on three classifiers’ generalization accuracies. Section 4 employs multilayer perceptron to predict the VEO based on the selected features and
discusses the results. Finally, in Section 5 conclusions and
future directions are derived. All the accuracies reported in
this paper are obtained from ten-fold cross-validation.
II. DATA AND VISUALIZATION

Information about violent acts carried out by VEOs across
the world is provided to this study by Radical and Violent Extremism (RAVE) Laboratory at The University of
Nebraska Omaha. They developed this dataset by first relying
on an open-source database on characteristics of extreme acts
of violence, called the global terrorism database (GTD) [8].
Violent acts are included in the GTD if they have a political,
social, religious, or economic motive, are intended to coerce,
intimidate, or publicize the cause, and/or if they violate international humanitarian law. Among other sources for their
dataset are: historical accounts described in open-source data
gathered from academic and government sources, scholarly
case studies, public-records databases (e.g. Lexis-Nexis), and
primary documents from VEOs themselves, such as propaganda and websites. Information was gathered by graduate
VOLUME 6, 2018

FIGURE 2. Number of violent acts by different VEOs from 1994 until 2016.

FIGURE 3. Number of violent acts per year from 1994 until 2016.

students with expertise in criminology, industrial and organizational psychology, and information science and technology from a cross functional research center. Coders received
20 hours of training prior to data collection on the nature
of VEOs, extremist recruitment, and related manifestations
in the context of extremism as well as on search tactics and
information filtering.
The dataset contains 3,416 records from the beginning
of 1994 until the end of 2016. Fig. 2 shows the number
of violent acts carried out by each VEO and the histogram
in Fig. 3 shows the number of violent acts per year. As it is
indicated, these violent acts have been sharply rising during
the past ten years, with the majority of them carried out by
well-known VEOs.
There are 17 characteristics associated with each violent
act in our dataset, described in Table 1. We refer to them as
features in the rest of this paper. The following steps are taken
to handle missing values in the dataset:
• Because the physical infrastructural damage is missed
for 35% of records, uniqueness of weapon used at the
time is missed for 16% of records, and importance of
victims to target culture is missed for 16% of records
in the dataset, these three features (indicated with a ∗
in Table 1) are removed from the dataset. That leaves us
with 14 features.
70165
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TABLE 1. Features and their description.

•

•
•
•

52 out of 3,416 records miss at least four features out
of 14 features. These records are removed from the
dataset.
The ordinal features’ mode is used to replace missing
values.
The average of the second and third quarters is used for
missing values in ratio features.
None of the nominal features have missing values.

Nominal features are coded as dummy vectors [9]. For
example, [1,0,0], [0,1,0], [0,0,1] are the dummy vectors for
70166

a nominal variable with three levels. All features are normalized to have a zero average and unit variance.
After transforming the training samples using principle
component analysis (PCA), we only kept the two principle component scores associated with the largest principle
component coefficients (also known as eigenvalues). PCA
centers the data and then uses the singular value decomposition (SVD) algorithm [10]. Fig. 4 (left) represents the
samples using these two principle component scores which
cover 13% of variance in the data. Due to the large number
of classes (14), they are not discriminated in this figure.
VOLUME 6, 2018
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FIGURE 4. Two dimensional visualization using PCA: (left) all samples, (right) only samples from the four largest classes.

FIGURE 5. Two dimensional visualization using PCA with a Gaussian kernel (σ = 1): (left) all samples, (right) only samples from the four largest
classes.

However, Fig 4 (right) distinguishes among samples from the
four largest classes in this two dimensional space. Obviously
there are two clusters in this figure but none of the classes
fit in any of the clusters. Applying PCA with a Gaussian
kernel [11] and visualizing the nonlinearly transformed data
using the two principle component scores associated with
the largest principle component coefficients, shown in Fig. 5,
revealed the same results.
III. SEQUENTIAL FORWARD FEATURE SELECTION

Our criterion for selecting features is the test accuracy of
three well-known classifiers with different non-linearities: a
linear (linear SVM), a slightly non-linear (non-linear SVM),
and a highly non-linear (decision tree) classifier. Table 2 lists
the classification accuracy of a linear SVM [12], a nonlinear
SVM with a Gaussian kernel, and a decision tree [13] based
on individual features. Minimum node size is set to 20 for
decision tree, smoothing parameter is set to 0.2 for SVM,
and σ is set to 1 for the Gaussian kernel in SVM. These
hyperparameters are set by cross-validation inside training
data.
For most features, the classification accuracy of the decision tree is close to the classification accuracy of the largestclass-assignment classifier (26.19%), which is the classifier
that assigns all the samples to the largest class. This means
that either splits in the decision tree hardly result in any
reduction in impurity or splits that work well for training data,
do not necessarily work as well for the test data. The former
is true for the splits at the top levels of the tree and the latter
is true for the splits at the bottom levels of the tree. Yet, test
samples mostly end up in the largest class. This shows that
VOLUME 6, 2018

all that happens in the decision tree is that the majority of
test samples land in the most represented class among the
training samples and no feature is alone sufficient for proper
classification.
Because there is no way that a linear classifier could
achieve the accuracy of the largest-class-assignment classifier, if the input features contain considerable randomness
with respect to the output class, the accuracy of linear classifiers must be compared with the accuracy of a random classifier (7.14% in our case). The accuracy of linear SVM, for
most features in Table 2, is around the accuracy of a random
classifier. This shows that any line attempting to separate the
classes (in a binary mode), based on one feature, would not
perform much better than a random classifier. This indicates
the randomness of that feature with respect to the output class.
It is noteworthy that SVM hyperplane designs the classifier
only based on the closest samples to the hyperplane (support
vectors) from the two classes [14]. Statistically, the larger
class will have more samples among support vectors than
the smaller class but the imbalance among support vectors
is much less severe than the imbalance among all samples.
The reason is that it is expected that both classes become
sparser around the border, assuming that the features are not
totally random. This is why SVM is a better choice – when
class imbalance is dramatic – in comparison with other linear
classifiers that optimize the separating hyperplane based on
all samples, e.g. least squares and perceptron.
Nonlinear SVM outperforms linear SVM in 71% of cases
in Table 2 and decision tree outperforms nonlinear SVM in
all cases. Its interpretation in this application is that the more
nonlinear the classifier, the higher the classification accuracy.
70167
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TABLE 2. Ten-fold cross validation of the decision tree, SVM, and kernel
SVM based on individual features.

generation because we are interested in the nature of the
selected features. We now follow the sequential forward feature selection algorithm, as shown below, to select the best
features.
Algorithm 1 Sequential Forward Feature Selection
l: number of features
1 for j = 1, . . . , l
2
for i = 1, . . . , l − j
3
temporarily include the i-th non-selected
feature in the feature set
4
ci = max{Accuracy of decision tree,
Accuracy of nonlinear SVM,
Accuracy of SVM}
5
cj = max {ci }
i

6
7
8
9

This makes it clear that the classes are very nonlinearly distributed in the feature space and a highly nonlinear classifier
would be the best choice for this dataset.
An interesting pattern in Table 2 is that the classification accuracies of the three classifiers are fairly correlated.
In other words, good features result in a better classification
accuracy regardless of the classifier. Another interesting point
is that, if the classification accuracy is used as the feature
selection criterion, the selected features would highly depend
on the choice of the classifier. For example, different features
would be selected when SVM’s classification’s accuracy is
used as the selection criterion than when decision tree’s classification accuracy is used.
Feature selection is an important step in reducing the
demand for large training datasets, mitigating the overfitting
problem, boosting the generalization accuracy, and reducing
the training time. We chose feature selection over feature
70168

if cj ≤ cj−1
return the feature set
else
permanently include the i-th non-selected
feature in the feature set

The selected features, in the same order as added by the
algorithm, along with their classification accuracy are listed
in Table 3. The selected features are L, N, F, G, E, M,
and I. The relative importance of a feature in the decision
tree is defined as sum of the impurity decreases over all
internal nodes for which that feature was chosen as the
splitting variable [15] and is a measure of how much each
feature contributes in training the decision tree. The relative importance of selected features in the decision tree are:
0.2584, 0.1235, 0.1428, 0.1372, 0.02, 0.1214, and 0.1967,
respectively. Interestingly, the relative importance of features
obtained from the decision tree does not fully correspond
with the order in which the features were selected by the
sequential forward selection algorithm, despite the decision
tree classification accuracy was the main criterion for feature selection in the algorithm. This points to the fact that
despite each feature’s relative importance in the decision tree
is a ballpark reflection of how helpful each feature could
be for generalizing the classification, it does not necessarily mirror it. It is noteworthy that classification accuracy is
a more legitimate criterion for feature selection than relative importance from decision tree because the former concerns the test data while the latter regards the training data.
In general, feature selection methods that involve the test
data are more optimal than those involving only the training
data.
Beyond the seven selected features, the addition of no other
feature would improve the maximum classification accuracy
of the three classifiers. For comparison purposes, the last
column in Table 3 shows the classification accuracy if all
features were used. Decision tree achieves a negligibly better
accuracy if only the selected features are used, rather than all
features. However, this is not the case for linear and nonlinear
SVM.
VOLUME 6, 2018
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TABLE 3. Selected features, in the same order as added by the sequential
forward selection algorithm, along with their classification accuracy.

TABLE 4. Average test accuracy and its std (obtained from ten-fold
cross-validation) for MLPs with six different settings.

IV. MULTILAYER PERCEPTRON

We employ the power of multilayer perceptron to predict the
VEOs based on the selected features. MLPs with six different
settings, listed in Table 4, are employed. Batch mode training
with backpropagation algorithm is applied to minimize the
cost function in Equation 1. The first term in Equation 1 is
the quadratic cost function which is the summation of squared
errors for each output neuron of each training sample, where
yj (i) and ŷj (i) are the desired and actual output of the j-th node
in the output layer for the i-th training sample, respectively, M
represents the number of output neurons and N the number of
training samples. The second term, which intends to mitigate
the overfitting problem, is the quadratic regularization term
which is the summation of squared synaptic weights (wk ),
where K represents the total number of synaptic weights in
the network.


N  X
M
K

X
X

1
2
J=
ŷj (i) − yj (i)
+ 0.05
w2k
(1)
2

i=1

j=1

i=1

The model is set not to update the synaptic weights after
those epochs resulting in an increase in the total cost. Adaptive learning is applied where a separate learning rate is used
for each synaptic weight in the network. A synaptic weight’s
learning rate is multiplied by 1.2 if the partial derivative
of the loss, with respect to that synaptic weight, keeps the
same sign (positive or negative) in two successive epochs and
multiplied by 0.7 otherwise [16]. Besides, all learning rates
are multiplied by 1.1 or 0.8 after each epoch based on whether
the total cost decreases or increases. Each MLP is trained for
h × 100 epochs, where h is the total number of hidden nodes
in the MLP. Table IV shows the average test error and its
standard deviation (obtained from ten-fold cross-validation)
for each MLP.
VOLUME 6, 2018

According to this table, all test errors are within one standard deviation of each other. Thus, we choose the simplest
MLP, the one with one hidden layer with 25 nodes, for further
investigations. Fig. 6 (top chart) shows how the training and
test errors evolve over training epochs, when only the selected
features are applied. Three following charts in Fig. 6 indicate
similar curves, for comparison purposes: (second chart) when
all features are used as input, (third chart) when the first
43 principle component scores of PCA are used as input, and
(fourth chart) when the first 43 principle component scores
of Gaussian kernel PCA are used as input. The number 43 is
chosen because the number of columns in the features matrix,
corresponding to the seven selected features, is also 43. Some
of the features are coded as dummy vectors and occupy more
than one column. The charts in Fig. 6 report the average
and standard deviation of training and test errors at each
epoch. The ten-fold cross-validation has been performed at
each epoch. Thus, the training and test errors at each epoch,
reported in Fig. 6, are the average over the ten folds. The
standard deviation of errors is also calculated over the ten
folds at each epoch.
When only selected features are used, the training error
falls down to 49% after 2,500 epochs, but when all features
are used, the training error falls down to 41%. This large
difference in training error is explained by overfitting a complex model to a larger number of features during training.
On the other hand, when only selected features are used,
the minimum test error is 61%, but when all features are used,
the minimum test error is 57%. The difference between the
test errors is half the difference between the training errors.
This shows that the feature selection process was effective
in: (a) picking features that improve the prediction model’s
generalizability to unseen data, (b) reducing the overfitting
problem on the training data, and (c) reducing the processing
burden by lessening the number of features.
The MLP with generated features from PCA performs
overall similar to the MLP with all features. The reason is
that the first 43 principle component scores of PCA capture
97.83% of the variance in the original feature space. This is
almost equivalent to using all the original features. Feature
generation methods are generally more efficient than feature
selection methods in reducing the number of features without
losing the variance in the original feature space, but generated
features are artificial and hard to interpret [9]. This is the
payoff for dismissing principle component scores with close
to zero variance in the PCA transformed space.
While the MLP with generated features from PCA performs best, the MLP with generated features from kernel
PCA performs worst. The MLP with kernel PCA generated
features saturates after around 700 epochs and never gets any
better than the largest-class-assignment classifier (with 74%
error rate). The main reason is that while PCA transforms the
data to a space with equal dimensionality, kernel PCA transforms the data to a space with a much larger dimensionality,
equal to the number of samples (3,364 in our case). Because
of this much larger dimensionality, the first 43 principle
70169
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component scores of kernel PCA capture only 13.87% of
the variance in the new feature space. Despite unfavorable
performance of kernel PCA in this specific application, there
are situations where kernel PCA is the preferred method of
feature generation and dimensionality reduction, e.g. when
classes form concentric hyper-spheres.
It is noteworthy that sequential forward feature selection
is supervised while PCA, either linear or nonlinear, is unsupervised. In other words, we selected features that maximize
the generalization accuracy to unseen data but PCA generates
features that align with the maximum variance in the original
feature space. Keeping features with the largest variance
is a heuristic method, though a feature that maximizes the
variance does not necessarily separates the classes as well
and might not optimize the generalization accuracy. The last
attempt on identifying the responsible group for extreme acts
of violence was performed by Hashemi and Hall [6]. They
applied six features, including human casualties and fatalities,
level of coordination and expertise, importance of the targeted
process, and the extent of its impact on the process. They
achieved a 20% cross-validation accuracy using a decision
tree, almost half the accuracy achieved by our MLPs.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

FIGURE 6. Training and test error with one standard deviation of
uncertainty for different epochs of MLP using; (top) selected features,
equivalent to 43 columns in the feature matrix, (second) all features,
(third) the first 43 principle component scores of PCA, (bottom) the first
43 principle component scores of Gaussian kernel PCA.
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This study was the first attempt to predict the responsible
VEO for acts of violence based on its human and structural
tolls, its target, intelligence, and weapons utilized in the
attack. Both linear and non-linear transformation of samples
into a two dimensional space clearly indicated two clusters.
However, all 14 classes had samples in both clusters and
no class was even closely contained in one cluster. Selected
features in order of their significance in generalizing the
model to unseen data to predict the responsible VEO for
an act of violence are: target type, attack type, level of
expertise, importance of the process affected by the attack,
level of coordination, weapon type, and symbolic nature of
the target. Unselected features include: number of casualties,
number of fatalities, number of hostages, level of execution,
scope of attack’s impact on processes, sequential attacks,
and uniqueness of attack method at the time. Looking at
these two feature sets tells us what aspects of an attack
are well-planned by VEOs and what aspects are more of
random consequences. For example, the choice of target is the
most prominent distinguishing factor among VEOs. In other
words, VEOs have more control over choosing their targets,
weapons, and how to carry out the attack which makes these
factors significant in identifying the responsible VEO. On the
other hand, the structural and human tolls and how well the
plan was executed are not much dependent on the responsible
VEO which could be interpreted as VEOs having less control
over these factors.
The generalization accuracy of an MLP for predicting the
responsible VEO based on the characteristics of the violent
act reached 39%, when only selected features are applied,
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43% when all features are applied, and 42% when PCA generated features are applied. This is a considerable improvement
over the accuracy of a random classifier (7.14%), a reasonable improvement over the accuracy of the largest-classassignment classifier (26.19%), linear SVM (16.91% for
selected features and 26.43% for all features), kernel SVM
(20.72% for selected features and 24.76% for all features),
and a slight improvement over the accuracy of the decision
tree (36.42% for selected features and 36.18% for all features).
In the dataset used in this research only one VEO is
responsible for each violent act. Thus, the assumption is made
that VEOs work independently. The prediction accuracy will
be adversely affected if an act of violence is carried out
as the result of coalition and intelligence sharing among
two or more VEOs with similar agendas and motivations.
In our future work, we intend to expand the width of our
dataset and investigate other features, including location and
time. These features are mostly unknown at the time. Additionally, the expansion of our dataset in length is the key to
application of deeper MLPs for predicting VEOs.
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